Challenging the obsession with local level institutions in country ownership of climate change adaptation

Working with local level actors to enable country ownership is applauded within the multilateral climate finance landscape. However, are emerging adaptation interventions equitable by reflecting the priorities of local level vulnerable populations? This research sought to find out whether the engagement of local institutions in projects that seek to achieve country ownership enabled local level vulnerable groups to participate in and influence adaptation decision-making processes and outcomes, thereby enabling them to have a voice in local level adaptation. It used a case study of a Global Environmental Facility-managed coastal adaptation project in Tanzania, which sought to restore and protect mangroves to enable adaptation to sea level rise. Data was generated from 13 Focus Group Discussions and survey questionnaires administered to 629 individuals in three locations on the mainland of Tanzania and in Zanzibar. The findings indicate that community-based organizations were used to facilitate the implementation of project activities at the community level. However, participation spaces created in the project and facilitated by these local institutions were exclusionary and failed to enable vulnerable community groups to have a voice on mangrove restoration and protection. Use of these local institutions altered local level power relations and disempowered other pre-existing and (in)formal local resource management institutions. Community members questioned legitimacy of actions implemented by these local institutions. These findings suggest that working with local level stakeholders to generate country ownership does not automatically guarantee that actions will address the needs of local vulnerable groups. Multilateral climate finance institutions should acknowledge these risks and implement measures to address them.     

Brexit: Tracking and disentangling the sentiment towards leaving the EU

On 23 June, 2016, the UK held a referendum to decide whether to stay in the European Union or leave. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of this referendum had major consequences for public policy, investment decisions, and currency markets. We discuss some of the subtleties involved in smoothing and disentangling poll data in light of the problem of tracking the dynamics of the intention to Brexit, and propose a multivariate singular spectrum analysis method that produces trendlines on the unit simplex. The trendline yield via multivariate singular spectrum analysis is shown to resemble that of local polynomial smoothing, and singular spectrum analysis presents the nice feature of disentangling the dynamics directly into components that can be interpreted as changes in public opinion or sampling error. The merits and disadvantages of some different approaches for obtaining smooth trendlines on the unit simplex are contrasted, in terms of both local polynomial smoothing and multivariate singular spectrum analysis.     

The State as Both Regulator and Player: The Politics of Transfer of Development Rights in China

The conventional argument that the introduction of transfer of development rights (TDR) shifts the power of land use regulation from the state to the market is increasingly under challenge. In China, the state's grip on land is reinforced through TDR, in which the state is both regulator and player. This state-dominated form of TDR affects China in three ways. First, competing aspirations of different scales of government complicate how TDR is implemented. Although the central state promotes TDR to maintain a national balance of arable land, some local states instrumentalize it to expand their landed basis of accumulation. Secondly, TDR tends to benefit the state but not its people. It may increase the fiscal income of the sending government and lessen the land shortage of the receiving government, but sometimes at the expense of the interests of land users without land ownership. Thirdly, given the state's deep involvement in TDR programs, the key for China's TDR to protect arable land lies not so much in clear property rights or a fully fledged market as in effective checks and balances regarding the state's powers over TDR. These three observations attest to the embeddedness of TDR in the local political economy.     

When companies improve the sustainability of the natural environment: A study of large U.S. companies

In light of the call for companies to abandon current approaches to environmental management, this study adds to the environmental strategy literature and uses the evidence of competitive dynamics among companies to identify a mechanism by which companies invest in proactive environmental strategies and thereby improve the sustainability of the natural environment. An examination utilizing fixed effects regressions on a sample of large U.S.‐based companies reveal that even after controlling the number, environmental and financial performance of leading (environmental) companies, laggard (environmental) companies are more likely to invest in proactive environmental strategies when their leading peers display higher sustainability orientations. Neither the expectation of government regulation nor social movement pressure was found to be influential in this relationship. Therefore, the future dominance of companies' investments in the sustainability of the natural environment will be driven by companies themselves as long as competitive advantages are expected.     

风险投资异质性与政府补贴创新效应——“锦上添花”还是“画蛇添足”?

在中国实现“创新大国”转向“创新强国”的政策背景下，增强企业创新需要政府和风险资本市场的积极支持。本文采取多元回归分析方法，以2009—2016年中国554家创业板上市公司为样本，研究政府补贴对企业创新“数量”和“质量”的影响。结果显示：政府补贴对企业创新“数量”和“质量”均有显著的促进作用；创新数量在政府补贴对创新质量的影响中起部分中介效应。进一步研究发现，风险投资异质性对政府补贴创新效应具有显著调节作用，其中风险投资的参与会减弱政府补贴对创新质量的正向影响，是“画蛇添足”的行为；国有背景风险投资的参与能显著增强政府补贴对创新质量的正向影响，是“锦上添花”的行为。本文拓展了政府补贴对企业创新影响的研究，丰富了宏观经济政策与微观企业行为的相关文献。本文的研究结论为理性认识国家创新驱动发展战略背景下政府补贴的创新效应，充分发挥风险资本市场的积极效应，实现政府和市场的双重驱动提供了经验证据。     

财政分权对城市创新的影响 ——基于地方政府竞争视角

本文利用2003—2016年中国278个城市的面板数据，基于地方政府竞争视角，探讨财政分权对城市创新水平的影响。结果表明：财政分权显著抑制城市创新水平的提升，且经过一系列稳健性检验后该结论依然成立；财政分权对城市创新水平的影响具有异质性，如在科教水平较低、级别较低及中小城市，财政分权显著抑制城市创新，而在科教水平较高、级别较高及大城市却并未抑制城市创新；财政分权通过促进地方政府“为增长而竞争”“为引资而竞争”、抑制地方政府“为创新而竞争”等途径对城市创新水平产生负向影响。研究结论为从政府财政体制改革视角促进城市创新提供启示。     

地方政府债务对工业资本配置效率的非线性影响效应——基于动态面板平滑转换回归PSTR模型的检验

经济新常态下,提高工业资本等要素配置效率是实现经济向高质量增长转变的必然要求。本文在政府主导、投资驱动的工业发展模式下,结合地方债务压力和金融发展差异门限变量,在非线性框架下运用动态面板平滑转换回归模型实证检验地方债务规模与工业资本配置效率的渐进演变关系。研究发现,适度的地方债务规模有助于提高资本配置效率,但随着债务压力增加,举债对资本配置的正效应逐步减弱并产生负效应。究其原因,适度举债能补齐工业基础设施短板,压低土地成本,对工业发展产生杠杆效应,从而提高资本配置效率;但过度举债推升财政风险,占用信贷资源并强化企业融资约束,造成资本配置低效率。此外,研究发现,地方信贷规模提升,能缓解举债的融资约束,促进工业行业间的资本流动;而工业金融深化程度提高,能增强市场竞争机制在要素配置中的作用,缓解举债造成投资错配,从而增强资本配置效率。以上分析结果表明,地方政府举债应更理性、适度、规范。     

Grants-in-aid and election outcomes in recipient jurisdictions: The impact of EU funds on mayoral elections in Poland

We analyze the impact of EU funds on the outcomes of Polish mayoral elections in 2010 and 2014. We employ an instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of EU funds. Our instruments approximate the availability of EU funds. The first instrument builds on the alignment of the local electorate with the regional donor government. The second instrument uses the funds spent in municipalities in the same sub-region dropped from the sample because the mayors do not run again. We do not find convincing empirical evidence in favor of the notion that EU funds increase the vote shares of mayors. We go on to test whether the electoral effect of EU funds is conditional on the attitude towards the donor institution among the population in the recipient population. This conditional factor is under-researched and politically virulent – given citizens’ skepticism towards the EU that Krastev (2017) describes for Central and Eastern European EU members. Our results are affirmative. EU funds increase the vote shares of mayors in municipalities where Krastev (2017) predicts the degree of EU skepticism to be low while they are not found to do so in municipalities where EU skepticism is predicted to be widespread. These results suggest that citizens’ attitudes towards the donor of vertical grants determine the political gains of recipients from using them.     

Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive and perceive the signal in that way. To empirically assess the relevance of the signalling channel at the municipal level, we conducted a survey among 2000 representative German citizens in 2018. Only a small fraction of voters feel well-informed about the fiscal budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician. Persons paying more attention to the signal sent by local politicians live in smaller municipalities, are more satisfied with their economic situation, are more educated, and do not feel that they are being electorally manipulated. Our analysis raises doubt about the relevance of budget composition as a signalling mechanism for voters at the local level.     

A ‘panoptical’ or ‘synoptical’ approach to monitoring performance? Local public services in England and the widening accountability gap

This article highlights how recent reforms to the auditing and assessment of local public services in England suggest there will be a shift from panoptical to ‘synoptical’ monitoring approaches. This is because the UK Government has abolished its centralised monitoring regime and instead required local authorities to publish a range of financial and performance datasets online, ostensibly so that citizens can hold organisations to account directly. However, the complexity and raw nature of these data, along with the sidelining of professional auditors, will result in most citizens being either unable or unwilling to undertake this task. As such, the proposed ‘synoptical’ approach will not materialise. Indeed, other legislative changes will mean that outsourcing firms effectively become the new, unaccountable observers of local public sector bodies within an enduring panoptical system. In many cases these companies will then assume responsibility for delivering the same services that they have assessed.